Take a paper process off your staff, and keep the record.

What is built

Each item below is generated from an inventory in which every entry names the source files that implement it. Where a capability has a boundary, the boundary is printed with it.

• A first-party electronic signature engine: templated documents, drag-placed fields, multiple signers with sequential or parallel ordering, one-time-passcode verification, coordinate-accurate stamping onto the source PDF, and a completion certificate.

  Boundary: Built in house. It is our own engine rather than a resold or white-labelled signature vendor, and we will not describe it as one.

• Automated parsing of insurance certificates and evidence documents: ACORD 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 101 and 131, a generic ACORD path, HO-4 dec pages, and application sections, with an OCR path for non-ACORD and scanned documents.

• A tokenized vendor upload portal: each vendor gets its own link, uploads certificates without an account in the main application, and sees its own open deficiencies and upload history.

  Boundary: Uploads are capped at ten megabytes and checked by file type. A portal link expires after ninety days.

• A multi-tenant, organization-scoped web application covering vendors, certificate holders, policies, rulesets, MVR orders, audit history, and billing settings.

• Sensitive personal data is encrypted at the field level before it is written to storage.

• Every server-side mutation writes an append-only audit row recording the actor, the action, the target, the timestamp and the caller fingerprint, with personal data scrubbed out of the recorded metadata before it is stored.

  Boundary: Two records, not one. Every mutation writes an append-only row, and the hash chain below covers the platform log specifically.

• The platform audit log is hash-chained: each row carries a SHA-256 over its canonical projection plus the previous hash, and a verifier walks a day of rows to show that none was inserted, removed or edited.

  Boundary: Chains reset at the UTC day boundary, and the hashed projection deliberately leaves out free-text metadata and IP address. It proves the record was not altered, not the contents of data we scrub.

• A machine-validated vendor risk register tracking each subprocessor's data classification, business-associate or data-processing agreement, and agreement expiry.

  Boundary: It tracks our own subprocessors and their agreements. It is not a vendor management product for your agency to run.

• The published terms state that the customer retains all rights to the documents and data it uploads, and that after termination it may request an export and have the data deleted.

  Boundary: Export is on request rather than a self-service button, and deletion is subject to the retention terms we publish.

• The public surface is built against WCAG 2.1 AA: a skip link to main content, visible keyboard focus states from the shared component library, semantic landmarks, and labelled form controls.

  Boundary: Built to that standard rather than certified against it. No third-party accessibility audit has been performed and no VPAT exists. If your solicitation requires one, say so and we will answer it as a gap instead of a checkbox.

• Every capability stated on our public government pages is rendered from an inventory in which each entry names the source files that implement it, and continuous integration fails the build when a named file disappears or when a feature we do not have reappears in marketing copy.

  Boundary: It proves the code we cite still exists and that a removed claim has not crept back. It is not a third-party audit and it does not certify that the code is correct.